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Half a century ago, Franklin Roosevelt, in one of his first offi-
cial acts, took the United States off the gold standard. That was
the most lasting effect of the March 1933 Bank Holiday and its
accompanying proclamations and legislation.1 This reversal of
more than fifty years' resolute adherence to the gold standard was
all the more remarkable because Roosevelt as candidate had exco-
riated Herbert Hoover's warning that the United States was close
to going off gold as "a libel on the credit of the United States."
Roosevelt declared that "no responsible government would have
sold to the country securities payable in gold if it knew that the
promise-yes, the covenant-embodied in these securities was as
dubious as the President of the United States claims it was."2
In 1980 American voters, again dissatisfied with .an economy
that was reducing the standard of living of the American worker,3
t Deputy Secretary of State of the United States and Harold J. and Marion F. Green
Professor of International Legal Studies, University of Chicago (on leave for government
service). Mr. Dam completed work on the manuscript of this article before assuming his
government position in September 1982. In any case the opinions expressed are solely his
own.
I Debate exists as to the precise date on which the United States can be said to have
left the gold standard. In April 1933 Roosevelt told the Secretary of the Treasury that he
had taken the country off the gold standard, to which the Secretary replied, "What?
Again?" R. MoLEY, THE FIRST NEw DEAL 298 (1966). See also D. ACHESON, MORNING AND
NOON 166-67 (1965). The President exploited the ambiguity of the term, see infra text ac-
companying note 36, and in his first press conference two days after the March 6 ban on the
export of gold enumerated possible criteria by which to judge adherence to the gold stan-
dard, some of which still obtained in the United States. 2 THE PuBLIc PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. RoosEVELT 33-35 (1938) [hereinafter cited as FDR PAPERS]. Nor did
he reject the gold standard out of hand, stating on April 19, 1933, "one of the things we
hope to do is to get the world as a whole back on some form of gold standard." Id. at 140.
* N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1932, § 1, at 10, col. 2; see also L. CHAMBERLAIN, THE PRESIDENT,
CONGRESS AND LEGISLATION 337 (1967); Garis, The Gold Clause, 165 ANNALS 219 (1933).
3 Real wages, which had risen steadily between 1948 and 1972 (with the exception of a
slight decline in 1958), declined between 1973 and November 1980, although nominal wages
continued to rise. In the latter period, real average weekly earnings in selected private non-
agricultural industries fell in 1967 dollars from $109 to $95; in current dollars they rose from
$145 to $245. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSmITrD TO THE CONGRESS, H.R.
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elected a President who, as a candidate, was thought to favor a
return to the gold standard.4 In March 1982 a Gold Commission,
mandated by Congress and appointed by the Secretary of the
Treasury, concluded that a restoration of the gold standard was
not desirable, although it recommended a minor step in that direc-
tion.5 Nevertheless, the return of the gold standard, though ac-
tively opposed by the Treasury, has remained a first priority for a
small but highly articulate group of economists and writers who
have popularized the concept of supply side economics and who
consider a return to the gold standard essential to the success of
supply side policies.'
In fact, legislation during the 1970's had already undone most
of the legislative steps taken under Roosevelt's leadership to elimi-
nate gold from American monetary law: citizens may now buy and
sell gold freely,7 and gold clauses are once again enforceable.8 The
Gold Commission recommended the further step of a "Treasury
issue of gold bullion coins of specified weights," albeit "without
dollar denomination or legal tender status."9
Even if the movement toward a gold standard goes no fur-
ther-and its future appears doubtful-the evolution in the role of
gold in the half century since 1933 warrants study for its own in-
herent interest and because it sheds light on the meaning of any
return to a gold standard. The emotion, ideology, and confusion
surrounding public discussion of the gold standard can best be
avoided by sober review of the evolving role of gold since the
Roosevelt decisions. Emphasis here will be on the 1935 Gold
Doc. No. 97-3, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 275 (1981) (Table B-37) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC
REPORT (1981)].
4 For President Reagan's pre-election position on gold, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1980,
at D2, col. 1; id., Apr. 25, 1980, at A27, col. 1.
6 1 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE ROLE OF GOLD IN THE DoMEs-
TIC AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEMS 1-21 (1982) [hereinafter cited as GOLD COMMIS-
SION REPORT].
6 I refer particularly to Arthur Laffer, Lewis Lehrman, and Jude Wanniski. Lehrman
was a member of the Gold Commission. See his minority report (filed jointly with Congress-
man Ronald Paul) in 2 GOLD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
7 Par Value Modification Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-110, § 3(b), (c), 87 Stat. 352,
352 (1973) (codified in part at 31 U.S.C. § 442 (1976) and printed in part at 31 U.S.C. § 443
notes (1976)); Exec. Order No. 11,825, 3 C.F.R., 1971-75 Comp., at 929-30 (1976); see infra
note 147 and accompanying text.
8 Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-147, § 4(c), 91 Stat. 1227, 1229 (printed at 31
U.S.C. § 463 note (1976)). A gold clause is a provision in a contract requiring "payment
either in gold proper, or in a nominal amount of currency equal to the value of a specified
weight of gold." M. F imrmAN &A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY I-ISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
1867-1960, at 468 (1963).
' 1 GOLD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
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Clause Cases.10 This review suggests that the economic conditions
that make a return to the gold standard most attractive also make
it most unattainable.
I
To understand the Gold Clause Cases, it is useful to begin the
analysis a half century earlier still, in 1879, when the United States
first went on the gold standard. It is also useful to make a sharp, if
somewhat unnatural, distinction between an international and a
domestic gold standard.
The international gold standard, contrary to popular belief,
had a relatively short life. It lasted only from 1879, when the
United States resumed payments of specie (that is, gold coin) in
redemption of its currency, until 1914, when that standard col-
lapsed as one of the first casualties of World War I. The interna-
tional gold standard enjoyed a partial revival from 1925, when
Britain returned to it, until 1931, when Britain again left it, or at
the latest until 1933, when the United States abandoned it.1
The gold standard can also be thought of as a purely domestic
set of legal rules. From that perspective one has an international
gold standard only when nations accounting for the great bulk of
international trade and investment have such a domestic standard.
Indeed, the international gold standard was never much more than
the international result and interaction of domestic gold standard
rules. 2
A domestic gold standard may thus be in force in a particular
country when it would be inaccurate to speak of an international
gold standard. It is common to date the gold standard in Britain
back to the early nineteenth"3 or even the eighteenth century.1'
And one can say that during much of the first half of the nine-
teenth century the United States, although de jure on a bimetallic
standard, had a de facto gold standard because the official ratio
between gold and silver was such that by the inexorable workings
10 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317
(1935); Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (consolidated for review with
United States v. Bankers Trust Co.).
1 See generally K. DAm, THE Ru s OF THE GAmE 14-70 (1982). In order to economize
on space, I shall refer the reader to RuLEs OF TmE GAm for more detailed discussion of a
number of points and particularly for more extensive documentation.
12 Id. at 23-24.
13 Id. at 24-25.
14 R. HAwTv, THE GOLD STANDARD IN THEORY AND RAcTIcE 66-68 (5th ed. 1947).
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of Gresham's law only gold coin circulated.15
The United States clearly was not on a gold standard for a
period beginning in 1861, when the North, under the financial
pressures of the Civil War, suspended specie payments.,, Gold coin
continued to circulate freely although in limited quantity com-
pared to the volume of paper money, which included United States
notes made legal tender in satisfaction of debts. 17 In what was later
called a dual monetary system, gold coin rose to a premium and
fluctuated daily in value, as measured by paper money.18
The resumption of specie payments did not occur until 1879,
when the premium on gold disappeared, and thereafter gold coin
exchanged at parity with paper money. Gold coin thenceforth was
worth in paper money the face amount of the coin,1 9 and the face
amount equalled the market value of the gold content of the coin.20
There was no reason for these values to depart from one another
because one could redeem paper money and receive gold coin. Or
one could turn in gold coin and receive paper. Similarly, gold bul-
lion could be minted into gold coins and gold coins could be
melted down to be sold as bullion.2 1 In the Gold Standard Act of
1900 Congress eliminated the last vestiges of any role for silver as a
monetary standard by declaring that "the dollar consisting of
twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of gold nine-tenths fine . . .
shall be the standard unit of value, and all forms of money issued
or coined by the United States shall be maintained at a parity of
value with this standard, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary
of the Treasury to maintain such parity."2 This statutory parity
" See K. DAM, supra note 11, at 19-20, 22. It is more accurate to say that Gresham's
law holds that cheap money drives out dear than that bad money drives out good. The
precondition for its operation is a legally fixed relation between the prices of two kinds of
currency and divergence of market prices from that fixed ratio. A fuller discussion of
Gresham's law may be found in id. at 20. Before the Civil War, gold was overvalued at the
mint; it was worth more as coin than as bullion on the market and hence was freely coined.
The reverse was generally true of silver. See also M. FRIDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note
8, at 27 n.16.
,* See Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 Sup. CT. Rav. 367, 370-82.
1 See M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 17 (Chart 1), 25-27.
"Id. at 26, 65 (Chart 5).
"See A. NusssuM, A HISTORY OF THE DOLLAR 130-31 (1957).
2" This equality held when the coin was newly minted, but wear or clipping could re-
duce a gold coin's weight and hence the value of the gold that it contained.
'2 For citations to the relevant statutes in force at the beginning of the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration, see Brief for the United States at 13-19 nn.16-23, Nortz v. United States, 294
U.S. 317 (1935), reprinted in 29 LANDMARK BRuFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 551, 567-69 nn.16-23 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Kurland & Casper].
22 Act of Mar. 14, 1900, cl. 41, § 1, 31 Stat. 45, 45 (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 314
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policy was to play a crucial role in the Gold Clause Cases.
Parity of gold coin, paper money, and bullion, simultaneously
in force in all commercially important countries, was the hallmark
of the international gold standard. One can see that fixed exchange
rates would result from such national systems so long as gold could
be imported and exported freely in each country. Moreover, using
present-day terminology, gold was the principal international re-
serve asset, although after the Great War the increasing use of for-
eign exchange as reserves led the variant of the gold standard in
operation from 1925 to 1933 to be called a "gold exchange" stan-
dard.23 However, the essential element in the international gold
standard-and this is a crucial point in contemporary discussions
of a return to the gold standard-was that there was a close link
between the domestic money supply in each country and its gold
holdings.24 It was an "essential element of the classical gold stan-
dard .. . that the money supply must be limited by the gold
reserves and a change in the gold reserves should be followed by a
change in monetary policy. '25 In part this link was reflected in
"gold cover requirements," such as the provision of United States
law specifying the value of gold that had to "back" issuances of
currency.26 More fundamental were the institutional arrangements
in each country causing increased or decreased public gold hold-
ings to lead respectively to a larger or smaller money supply.27
Whether the circulation of gold coin was essential to a gold
standard, either domestic or international, may be debated. Cer-
tainly many countries, though not the United States, suppressed
gold coin circulation after World War I in order to concentrate
gold reserves in their central banks in defense of their currencies.2 8
But the free import and export of gold bullion in response to
changing economic conditions left the gold standard essentially in-
(1976)) (emphasis added).
:3 See generally K. DAM, supra note 11, at 55-57, 64-69.
24 The process by which gold flows, under the international gold standard, financed
payment imbalances and adjusted credit conditions and price levels is the subject of a vast
amount of writing, which has continued to the present day. See, e.g., NATIONAL BUREAu OF
ECON. RESEARCH, INC., REP. No. 17, A RETRosPEcTIvE ON THE CLASSICAL GOLD STANDARD,
1821-1931 (summer 1982) (report of a conference held by the National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc., Mar. 18-21, 1982).
25 Bernstein, Is a Return to the Gold Standard Feasible?, in 2 GOLD COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 310, 314.
28 Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 16, 38 Stat. 251, 266 (1913) (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 411-416, 418-421, 248, 360 (1976)); see infra note 133.
27 See K. DAM, supra note 11, at 25-28, 42-43, for the operation of such institutional
arrangements in Britain before and after the first world war. See also id. at 57-58.
25 Id. at 43, 55-56.
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tact, to the extent that monetary authorities did not try to attenu-
ate the impact of international gold flows on their domestic money
supply by offsetting transactions. Such offsetting transactions, ap-
parently already significant before World War I, became common
during the 1925-33 restoration of the international gold standard. 9
II
By the time Roosevelt came to office the gold standard was
near collapse. Britain left it in 1931 under the pressure of gold out-
flows and sterling weakness. Sterling depreciated sharply against
the dollar. Many other countries were forced to follow suit,30 leav-
ing the United States and the small European "gold bloc" as iso-
lated adherents to the gold standard.3'
When, in his first week in office, Roosevelt took the United
States off the gold standard, he was not forced to do so by circum-
stances of the kind that had earlier impelled Britain to abandon it.
Though the depreciation of a number of other currencies had hurt
U.S. exports and increased imports to the detriment of U.S. manu-
facturers and though the United States lost one-fifth of its mone-
tary gold stock between September 1931 and July 1932, it never-
theless held more gold at the beginning of March 1933 than it had
in 1929, the heyday of the post-War gold standard.32 Rather, as we
shall see later, Roosevelt chose to leave the gold standard in order
to gain freedom to increase domestic prices, especially farm prices,
without any constraints from the gold standard. Indeed, he wanted
to use various gold transactions, domestic and foreign, to raise
prices.33
Roosevelt rapidly eliminated all of the elements of a gold stan-
11 Id. at 30-31, 58-59.
30 See Brief for the United States and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at 38 &
n.16, United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (chronological list of countries
abandoning the gold standard), reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 262 &
n.16.
31 Id. at 38-39, reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 262-63. The few re-
maining "gold bloc" countries of Europe-France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, and
Switzerland-temporarily sustained the gold standard but were forced to abandon it in
1935-36. Others, such as Germany and Italy, had not officially suspended gold payments but
had imposed foreign exchange regulations that effectively negated its operation. Many non-
European countries, such as Canada, India, Japan, Chile, and Mexico, had abandoned the
gold standard in 1931-32. See also L. CHANDLER, AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY 1928-41, at
302-04 (1971); Foreign Banking and Business Conditions, Annual Report of the Bank for
International Settlements, 21 FED. RESERVE BULL. 360, 360-61 (1935); Review of the Month,
21 FED. REsERv BuLL. 257, 260-61 (1935).
32 See Review of the Month, 19 FED. RESERvE BULL. 209, 212 (1933).
" See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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dard. On March 6, 1933, he used the dubious authority of the 1917
Trading with the Enemy Act3 4 to prohibit banks from paying out
or exporting gold coin and bullion.3 5 International gold flows be-
came impossible, and any immediate link between gold and the
money supply was effectively terminated. Roosevelt knew what he
was doing. At a press conference two days later he joked, "[a]s long
as nobody asks me whether we are off the gold standard or gold
basis, that is all right, because nobody knows what the gold basis
or gold standard really is,""6 but after some obfuscation about the
elements of a gold standard, he conceded that "what you are com-
ing to now really is a managed currency. '37 On March 9 he sought
confirming legislation,3 8 which was delivered that very day in the
Emergency Banking Act,39 empowering the Secretary of the Trea-
sury to require the surrender of all gold coin, gold bullion, and gold
certificates against payment of paper money of the same face
value. This power to "nationalize" gold was promptly im-
plemented.40
These steps were taken at a time when "inflation" had wide
support, support that was not restricted to populists, agrarians,
radicals, and the silver lobby but that also embraced businessmen
- Ch. 106, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 411, 415 (1917) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1976); 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976)). The Trading with the Enemy Act granted special powers in
response to wartime conditions.
3' See Proclamation No. 2039 (Mar. 6, 1933), reprinted in 2 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1,
at 24.
36 2 FDR PAPERs, supra note 1, at 33-34.
37 Id. at 36.
38 Id. at 45-46 (Recommendation to the Congress for Legislation to Control Resumption
of Banking (Mar. 9, 1933)).
39 Ch. 1, § 3, 48 Stat. 1, 2 (1933) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1976)).
40 See Exec. Order No. 6073 (Mar. 10, 1933) (prohibiting gold payments and exports)
(amended by Proclamation No. 2725, 12 Fed. Reg. 2343 (1947); revoked in part by Exec.
Order No. 11,825 (Dec. 31, 1974), 40 Fed. Reg. 1003 (1974), which is printed at 12 U.S.C. 95a
note (1976)), reprinted in 2 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 54; Exec. Order No. 6102 (Apr. 5,
1933) (requiring delivery of gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates to the government),
reprinted in 2 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 111; Exec. Order No. 6111 (Apr. 29, 1933)
(defining the Secretary of the Treasury's authority to embargo gold exports), reprinted in 2
FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 141. See also Regulations Relating to Licensing the Purchase
and Export of Gold, 19 FED. RESERVE BULL. 267 (1933). Executive Orders Nos. 6102 and
6111 were replaced and amended by Exec. Order No. 6260 (Aug. 28, 1933) (amended by
Exec. Order No. 10,896 (Nov. 29, 1960), 25 Fed. Reg. 12,281 (1960), Exec. Order No. 10,905
(Jan. 20, 1962), 26 Fed. Reg. 321 (1961), Exec. Order No. 11,037 (July 20, 1962), 27 Fed.
Reg. 6967 (1962), and revoked by Exec. Order No. 11,825 (Dec. 31, 1974), 40 Fed. Reg. 1003
(1974)), reprinted in 2 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 345, and by Exec. Order No. 6556
(Jan. 12, 1934) (printed at 12 U.S.C. § 95a note (1976)). Exec. Order No. 6261 (Aug. 29,
1933) then governed sale of newly mined domestic gold through the Treasury, 2 FDR PA-
PERS, supra note 1, at 352.
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and banking experts, such as Marriner Eccles and Representative
Steagall, and the disparate members of the Committee for the Na-
tion.41 There was no unanimity, however, as to the methods for
achieving inflation and the rationales offered as to why they would
work. Roosevelt, with his famous "flexibility," appears to have se-
lected method and rationale according to the needs of the moment.
His goal was to achieve higher prices. But he was not a monetarist
and his strategy turned less on inflating the money supply42 (al-
though breaking the link with gold facilitated this effect) than on
direct means to increase prices. The National Recovery Adminis-
tration's much publicized system of industrywide production car-
tels is a characteristic example. To Roosevelt, another means was
devaluation of the dollar. The effect would be, in his view, to raise
directly and proportionately the prices of farm products and raw
materials traded internationally and perhaps to raise other prices
as well.
43
Congressional authorization to devalue the dollar was obtained
less than ten weeks after Roosevelt's inauguration. In accordance
with the accepted view of the matter, the legislation was phrased
in terms of authority to reduce the weight of the gold dollar.""
Roosevelt did not exercise that authority immediately and indeed
41 See M. ECCLES, BECKONING FRONTIERS 122-24, 129-32 (1951); see also A. SCHLES-
INGER, THE AGE OF RoosEvELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 41-42, 195-99 (1959). Eccles,
a Utah banker and industrialist, was appointed Governor of the Federal Reserve Board by
Roosevelt. See M. ECCLES, supra, at 175-76. Steagall was chairman of the House Banking
and Currency Committee.
42 For example, although the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
ch. 25, § 43(a), (b)(1), 48 Stat. 31, 51-52 (1933) (current version of § 43(a) at 31 U.S.C. § 821
(1976); (b)(1) repealed 1945 & 1965), provided for expansion of Federal Reserve credit by $3
billion and the issuance of a like amount of fiat currency, Hurst argues that these easy
money measures were "forced on a reluctant president by congressmen moved partly by
business expansionists [and] by traditional farmer favor for easy money." J. HURST, A LE-
GAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970, at 232 (1973).
" See 3 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 70-73. See also M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 8, at 464-66 (on the measures used to raise commodity prices). Roosevelt appar-
ently did not favor inflation for its own sake. Rather he sought to offset the decline in
producer prices that had already taken place. See 2 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 74-79. In
July 1933 he told the London Economic Conference that his long-run goal was "the kind of
dollar which a generation hence will have the same purchasing and debt-paying power as
the dollar value we hope to attain in the near future." Id. at 265.
4" Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, § 43(b)(2), 48 Stat. 31, 52-53 (1933) (authoriza-
tion expired in 1943 following an amendment that extended this presidential power to 1939
and added an automatic expiration clause, Act of Jan. 23, 1937, ch. 5, § 2, 50 Stat. 4, 4
(1937), and following later amendments that extended the power to 1941 and 1943 respec-
tively, Act of July 6, 1939, ch. 260, § 3, 53 Stat. 998, 998; Act of June 30, 1941, ch. 265, § 2,
55 Stat. 396, 396. On the provision regarding weight of the gold dollar, see infra text accom-
panying note 57.
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waited until January 31, 1934, to do so.45 Rather, at the behest of
the Administration, Congress first took the precaution by a Joint
Resolution of June 5, 1933, of invalidating gold clauses in public
and private contracts.46 This Joint Resolution provided that "every
provision... with respect to any obligation which purports to give
the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind
of coin or currency... is... against public policy" and that all
past or future obligations, "whether or not any such provision is
contained therein . . . shall be discharged upon payment, dollar
for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is
legal tender. '47 One purpose, and in retrospect the most important
purpose, was to give "private debtors with gold clause obligations
; . . protection and a prompt and clear definition of their legal po-
sition '"4 8 -in short, to assure that creditors would not be able to
enforce gold clauses when the dollar was devalued.
Before discussing how the Supreme Court dealt with the Joint
Resolution when it first came before it in 1935, it is worth noting
how Roosevelt dealt with gold issues in the interim. The departure
from the gold standard had permitted a sharp rise in the gold price
even before the Joint Resolution. In addition, the dollar depreci-
ated by nearly fifteen percent against the French franc (which was
still on gold) between mid-April and early May 1933.49 But
Roosevelt, faced by a renewed decline in prices and agricultural
unrest, was not content with market forces and sought to induce
greater dollar depreciation over the course of the autumn of 1933
by a concerted gold buying program.50 The Reconstruction Finance
Corporation ("RFC") began to buy not merely newly mined U.S.
gold but also existing gold in the world market.51 Though Attorney
General Homer Cummings and RFC General Counsel (later Su-
41 See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
46 Ch. 48, § 1, 48 Stat. 112, 113 (1933) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 463 (1976)). On the role
of the Administration see Review of the Month, 19 FED. REsERWv BULL. 331, 333 (1933). For
differing explanations of the Administration's anxiety for quick passage of the Joint Resolu-
tion, see N.Y. Times, June 5, 1933, § 1, at 14, col 1; id., June 6, 1933, § 1, at 35, col. 8. See
also Second "Fireside Chat" (May 7, 1933), reprinted in 2 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at
160, 165-66.
47 Ch. 48, § 1, 48 Stat. 112, 113 (1933) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 463 (1976)).
48 S. REP. No. 99, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 19 FED. RESERVE BULL. 334
(1933).
49 M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 465; Review of the Month, 19 FED.
RESERVE BULL. 331, 333, 342 (1933).
50 See D. ACHESON, supra note 1, at 174-78; J. WARBURG, THE MoNEY MUDDLE, 135-46
(1934); see also A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 41, at 234-41.
81 Fourth "Fireside Chat" (Oct. 22, 1933), reprinted in 2 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at
420, 426-27.
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preme Court Justice) Stanley Reed formally opined that the RFC
gold buying program was authorized by statute, 2 Undersecretary
of the Treasury Dean Acheson resigned because he thought that he
was implicated in an unconstitutional program.53
The gold buying program succeeded in raising the price of
gold from an initial price of $31.36 an ounce to $34.45 by January
1934.5 The dollar depreciated more or less to the same extent in
foreign exchange markets,55 although Keynes characterized the
"recent gyrations of the dollar" as "more like a gold standard on
the booze than the ideal managed currency of my dreams."5 On
January 15, 1934, the President acted to stabilize and consolidate
the results of his policy. He requested authority to devalue the dol-
lar in terms of gold to between fifty and sixty percent of its origi-
nal value (though he had already secured authority to devalue to
fifty percent 57) and authority for the Treasury to buy and sell gold
and foreign exchange to stabilize the dollar in foreign exchange
11 See 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 315 (1936) (Cummings); D. ACHESON, supra note 1, at 261-66
(Reed opinion).
" See D. ACHESON, supra note 1, at 177-78, 180-82, 186-92. Reed's and Acheson's opin-
ions on the program's constitutionality are printed side-by-side by Acheson. See id. at 261-
66. Acheson privately consulted Justice Brandeis, who refused to give a private ruling, stat-
ing, "Dean, if I wanted a legal opinion, I would prefer to get it from you than from [Attor-
ney General] Homer Cummings." Id. at 181. The ground of Acheson's resignation was his
objection to the method of buying gold through the RFC. He accepted, however, the neces-
sity for the Joint Resolution. 4d. at 167, 186-92.
- See Other Banking and Financial Statistics, 20 FED. RESERVE BULL. 133 (1934); Re-
view of the Month, 19 FE. RESERvE BULL. 669, 676 (1933).
5 19 FED. RESERVE BULL. 679, 740 (1933); 20 FED. RESERE BULL. 91 (1934). Friedman
and Schwartz have argued that the same exchange rate effect "would have followed from the
same dollar volume of government purchase of wheat or perfume or foreign-owned art mas-
terpieces." M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 466. This clearly was not the view
of influential U.S. government officials at the time who thought gold played a unique role in
determining exchange rates. See D. ACHESON, supra note 1, at 174-75, for the views of the
group centered around Henry Morgenthau and George F. Warren: "The only way to [raise
commodity prices] is by controlling the gold value of the dollar and forcing it downward."
Id. at 175. On Roosevelt's own view of the gold buying policy as a means of depressing the
gold value of the dollar, see his January 15, 1934, press conference, 3 FDR PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 46, 48-49, 53.
" Letter from John Maynard Keynes to President Roosevelt (Dec. 1933), reprinted in
ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-45, at 181 (M. Freedman an-
not. ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as ROOSEvELT AND FRANKFURTER]. Keynes was not alone in
his strictures on the "instability" resulting from the gold-buying policy. See the "influen-
tial" letter of criticism and advice from a group of Oxford economists to the President (Nov.
1933), reprinted in ROoSEvELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra, at 168-73, and its attentive recep-
tion in Washington, Letter from President Roosevelt to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 22, 1933),
reprinted in RooSEVEILT AND FRANKFURTER, supra, at 183-84. See also A. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 41, at 245-46; J. WARURG, supra note 50, at 154-59.
57 See M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 465; see also supra notes 42, 44-
45 and accompanying text (discussion of the Thomas Amendment).
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markets.58 The authority was promptly granted in the Gold Re-
serve Act and on January 31, 1934, the President proclaimed a new
gold content of 15-5/21 grains 9/10 fine gold, a reduction to 59.06 %
of the former weight, equal to an official gold price of thirty-five
dollars an ounce.59
The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 took one further step to eradi-
cate remaining gold standard symbols. In Roosevelt's own words,
the Act "abolished gold coin as a component of our monetary sys-
tem."60 All gold coin was to be withdrawn from circulation and
formed into gold bars.61 Even the Treasury was thenceforth to hold
gold only in the form of bullion. 2 Gold was thereafter to be a com-
modity, not money. It could be sold for industrial and dental uses.
Coin collectors could still hold gold coins but only those of numis-
matic value. 3 Although U.S. citizens could not hold gold in the
United States, they could deal freely in gold "situated outside the
United States,"6 4 a privilege not withdrawn until the Kennedy
Administration. 5
III
The four major gold clause cases were decided by the Supreme
Court in 1935.66 The cases of Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Rail-
road and United States v. Bankers Trust Co. were decided to-
gether6 7 and involved private obligations. In both, the Joint Res-
olution invalidating gold clauses was held constitutional, and
corporate bonds containing gold clauses were therefore held dis-
" Request for Legislation to Organize a Sound and Adequate Currency System, Janu-
ary 15, 1934, reprinted in 3 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 40, 42-43.
, Gold Reserve Act of 1934, ch. 6, §§ 10, 12, 48 Stat. 337, 341-43 (current version at 31
U.S.C. §§ 314, 821, 822a (1976)); Proclamation No. 2072 (Jan. 31, 1934), and accompanying
statement, reprinted in 3 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 64-70.
60 Presidential Statement accompanying Proclamation No. 2072 (Jan. 31, 1934), re-
printed in 3 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 75.
61 Gold Reserve Act of 1934, ch. 6, § 5, 48 Stat. 337, 340 (current version at 31 U.S.C. §
315b (1976)).
" Id. § 6 (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 408a (1976)).
"Provisional Regulations Issued Under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, § 20, 20 FED.
RESERVE BULL. 82, 85 (1934).
Treasury statement of January 30, 1934, 20 FED. RESERVE BULL. 81 (1934).
65 See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
"See supra note 10. A fifth gold clause case was decided in 1937: Holyoke Water
Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324 (1937). See also Guaranty Trust Co.
v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939) (dealing with optional foreign payment of gold clause
bonds); Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329 (1937) (dealing with the call of United States
Bonds containing gold clauses).
67 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
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chargeable at the nominal face amount."8
The reasoning was straightforward. Congress had broad power
over the value of money. The source of this monetary power was
derived not merely from the coinage power expressly granted in
the Constitution 9 but from
the aggregate of the powers granted to the Congress, embrac-
ing the powers to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States, to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of for-
eign coin, and fix the standards of weights and measures, and
the added express power "to make all laws which shall be nec-
essary and proper for carrying into execution" the other enu-
merated powers.7 1
In execution of those powers Congress had the power of "frustrat-
ing the expected performance of contracts,' 71 and such an impact
on private contractual relations did not constitute a taking under
the fifth amendment. 72 Since, under the circumstances prevailing
in 1933, gold clauses constituted an "actual interference" with its
broad monetary powers, Congress had the power to invalidate such
clauses. 73 As discussed below, the factual analysis leading to the
conclusion that gold clauses interfered with the exercise of the
monetary power is not wholly satisfactory.4 The legal reasoning,
on the other hand, is unexceptionable, particularly to a modern-
day reader accustomed to vast congressional power over the
economy.
The other two cases, Nortz v. United States5 and Perry v.
United States,7 e involved obligations of the federal government. In
Nortz, a holder of gold certificates acting under compulsion of the
nationalization orders and regulations had surrendered the certifi-
cates to the Treasury on January 17, 1934. At that time gold was
being purchased by the Treasury at $34.45 (and therefore traded
on world markets at approximately that price) and two weeks later
" Id. at 302, 316.
6' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
70 294 U.S. at 303 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18). For a discussion of the limits
of the coinage power and its relation to other bases of power over the value of money, see
Dam, supra note 16, at 391.
71 294 U.S. at 304; see also id. at 306-11.
72 Id. at 305.
73 Id. at 311, 316.
74 Infra part IV.
71 294 U.S. 317 (1935).
76 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
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the President, acting under authority he had sought from Congress
on January 15," had devalued the dollar, changing the official gold
price from $20.67 to $35.00 per ounce. Nonetheless, the plaintiff,
having sued for recovery at $33.43 per ounce (the London price on
January 17), was held to be entitled to be recompensed for his gold
certificate only at the rate of $20.67 per ounce.78
Hence, unlike the private obligation cases where the Court had
held that no fifth amendment taking had occurred, the taking was
conceded but "just compensation" was held to require payment
only at the $20.67 price. The theory was that even if gold coin had
been paid out by the Treasury, the holder would have had no al-
ternative but to return the coin to the Treasury and to be compen-
sated at the official gold price. Since gold coin could not be sold at
the $34.45 bullion price available to gold producers and since it
was then unlawful to export gold coin in order to receive the world
price, the holder was entitled to no more than the nominal value of
the certificate, which was calculated at the $20.67 price. The Court
emphasized that a gold certificate was currency, not a warehouse
receipt for gold, but the decision did not turn on that point. In
effect, price controls had held the price of gold certificates to
$20.67, and so the holder was entitled to no more.79
Perry, a case involving a 1917 U.S. government bond that was
called for redemption in April 1934,0 extended the Nortz reason-
ing. Because the $10,000 bond made principal and interest "'paya-
ble in United States gold coin of the present standard of value' "81
and because under prior Supreme Court rulings U.S. government
obligations could not be invalidated by subsequent legislation, 2
7 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
78 294 U.S. at 330. Nortz claimed that on January 17, 1934, "an ounce of gold was of the
value at least of $33.43." Id. at 329. The official U.S. price on that day was $34.45. 20 FED.
RESERVE BuLL. 133 (1934). For London prices, see Plaintiff's Reply Brief at 5 n.2, Nortz v.
United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935), reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 597
n.2. Under legislation originally enacted during the Civil War, the Treasury could issue gold
certificates against deposits or holdings of gold coin and bullion. In 1919 gold certificates
were made legal tender. For the relevant legislation, see the summary in the Nortz opinion,
294 U.S. at 325-26.
79 294 U.S. at 328-30.
80 294 U.S. at 347.
81 Id. (quoting terms of bond).
82 See The Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1879). See also Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934), a case decided the previous Term, in which the Court in an opin-
ion by Justice Brandeis ruled that Congress did not have the power to repudiate contractual
insurance obligations of the United States. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4
("The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,.., shall not be
questioned.").
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Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a four-member plurality, ruled
the Joint Resolution unconstitutional insofar as it applied to gold
clauses in such obligations.83 But the Court nonetheless relegated
the holder of the government bond to receiving merely the face
amount of $10,000 in legal tender currency. The Court reasoned
that unlike the post-Civil War period, when coin and paper money
floated in the marketplace at prices determined by supply and de-
mand, the period of the Gold Clause Cases had a "single monetary
system with an established parity of all currency and coins. 84
Even under the pre-1933 legislation, a gold coin could have been
legal tender only for its face amount, not for the value of its gold
content. Thus even if the bond had been paid in gold coin and
even assuming that gold coin did not have to be surrendered to the
government at the $20.67 price under the 1933 regulations, the
bondholder could not have exchanged his gold coin at the thirty-
five dollar price because no recipient. would have been required to
treat it as legal tender for more than its face amount. Moreover, he
could not have exported the gold coin or sold it for its gold con-
tent. As a result, the holder had no legally cognizable loss of
purchasing power. 5 Since there was no "actual loss," recovery of
money at the gold value-$1.69 per $1.00 face amount of the
bonds-would "constitute not a recoupment of loss in any proper
sense but an unjustified enrichment."8
The reasoning on the lack of damages in Perry was convoluted
and suspect, as a fledgling Harvard law professor, Henry Hart,
made clear in justifying his conclusion that "[flew more baffling
pronouncements, it is fair to say, have ever issued from the United
Is See 294 U.S. at 346-58. Because Justice Stone, the fifth member of the five-man
majority, concurred specially, there was no opinion of the Court in Perry. Stone's concur-
rence, id. at 358, was limited to the question of the claimant's entitlement "to receive from
the United States an amount in legal tender currency in excess of the face amount of the
bond," id. at 347. He aligned himself with Hughes in holding that there was "no damage
because Congress, by the exercise of its power to regulate the currency, has made it impossi-
ble for the plaintiff to enjoy the benefits of gold payments promised by the Government."
Id. at 360 (Stone, J., concurring). However, he refrained from ruling on any wider constitu-
tional question, and thought it "undesirable, for the Court to undertake to say that the
obligation of the gold clause in Government bonds is greater than in the bonds of private
individuals." Id. at 359 (Stone, J., concurring). See A. MASON, HARLAN FisK STONE 391-92
(1956). In all four Gold Clause Cases, four Justices-McReynolds, Van Devanter, Suther-
land, and Butler-dissented.
" 294 U.S. at 357. This was largely as a result of the parity clause of the Gold Standard
Act of 1900. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
43 294 U.S. at 356-58.
86 Id. at 358.
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States Supreme Court. '87 Hart was anxious to show that the Joint
Resolution was constitutional even as applied to government gold
clause obligations. The reasoning of the Perry plurality on the con-
stitutional issue was, however, less important to the future of gold
than was the result, which rendered gold clauses just as ineffective
in government obligations as in private obligations.8 More inter-
esting therefore are the economic and social reasons that led a ma-
jority of the Court to invalidate, de jure for private obligations and
de facto for public obligations, solemn promises that had been bar-
gained for with the very eventuality in mind that led to their inval-
idation-the depreciation of the currency in terms of gold.
IV
In considering the factual basis for the Court's finding of an
"actual interference" with the monetary power of Congress, it is
first useful to clear away an issue of interpretation of the gold
clauses themselves. Were they "gold coin" or only "gold value"
clauses? If the former, then the creditor could claim gold coin. The
consequence of their enforcement might then be, as the Court rea-
soned in Norman, "to increase the demand for gold, to encourage
hoarding, and to stimulate attempts at exportation of gold coin,"
which would indeed conflict with the congressional policy of calling
in all privately held gold.89 If, despite the explicit wording calling
for payment "'in gold coin'" or "'in United States gold coin,' -9
the clauses could be interpreted as merely requiring payment of
the present day currency equivalent of the promised gold coin,
then no impact on gold holdings, public or private, could be antici-
pated. During the greenback period, the Supreme Court had been
wont to construe gold clauses as "gold coin" clauses in order to
protect creditors from the legal tender legislation. 1 As both the
Permanent Court of International Justice" and the British House
8, Hart, The Gold Clause in United States Bonds, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1935).
The constitutional justification for the 1933 Joint Resolution and the legal reasoning
in the Gold Clause Cases have been subjected to voluminous analysis. Among the best arti-
cles are Dawson, The Gold Clause Decisions, 33 MICH. L. REv. 647 (1935), Dickinson, The
Gold Decisions, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1935), and Hart, supra note 87.
89 Norman, 294 U.S. at 313.
90 Id. at 293 (quoting terms of bond); Perry, 294 U.S. at 347 (quoting terms of bond).
91 See, e.g., Trebilcock v. Wilson, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 687 (1872); Dewing v. Sears, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 379 (1871); Butler v. Horwitz, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 258 (1869); Bronson v.
Rodes, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 229 (1869). See also Thompson v. Butler, 95 U.S. 694 (1878) (Court
held the amount in controversy was insufficient to give it jurisdiction). But see Gregory v.
Morris, 96 U.S. 619 (1878) (treating a gold clause as a gold bullion clause).
92 Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Serbia),
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of Lords9 had more recently treated gold clauses as "gold value"
clauses, however, the 1935 Supreme Court was willing to treat the
clauses before them as "gold value" clauses.94 Once that concession
was made, the Court's concern to protect the congressional deci-
sion to "choose ...a uniform monetary system, and to reject a
dual system"95 became irrelevant because gold value clauses could
be enforced without according any monetary role to gold. It would
suffice to determine the present market value of gold equal to coins
of the weight and fineness referred to in the contractual
clause-which in Norman was "'gold *coin of the United States of
America of or equal to the standard weight and fineness existing
on February 1, 1930.' "9
The question consequently became how requiring a private
debtor to pay $1.69 instead of $1.00 for each face dollar of princi-
pal and interest would interfere with the monetary power of Con-
gress. In attempting to give a satisfactory answer to that question,
the Court emphasized the large volume of gold clause obligations.
The result of enforcing the clauses, even on a gold value basis,
would be "dislocation of the domestic economy. '97 The Court did
not bother to explain the causation or nature of the dislocation.
Rather, it contented itself with the rhetorical flourish that "[i]t re-
quires no acute analysis or profound economic inquiry to disclose"
the dislocation that would result if "debtors under gold clauses
should be required to pay one dollar and sixty-nine cents in cur-
rency while respectively receiving their taxes, rates, charges and
prices on the basis of one dollar of that currency."98 Yet "analysis,"
whether "acute" or otherwise, of why it would harm the economy,
as opposed to individual debtors, to give effect to bargained-for
promises was totally lacking in the Gold Clause Cases. Some cor-
porations might indeed become insolvent if the debt were inter-
preted to be $1.69 rather than $1.00, but that need not necessarily
result in either lower output or higher unemployment in the
economy.
1929 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 20, at 48 (Judgment of July 12); Concerning the Payment in Gold
of the Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Braz.), 1929 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 21,
at 110 (Judgment of July 12).
Feist v. Soci~t6 Intercommunale Belge d'Electricit6, 1934 A.C. 161, 175 (H.L. 1933).
' See Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. at 302, 314. For a more elaborate tri-
partite distinction among types of gold clauses, see Hart, supra note 87, at 1060-61 n.13.
" 294 U.S. at 316.
"Id. at 293 (quoting terms of bond).
97 Id. at 315.
94 Id. at 315-16.
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The government's brief in Bankers Trust made some effort to
calculate the impact of holding gold clauses valid. It analyzed debt
service (interest plus amortization of principal) and concluded that
enforcement of gold clauses on both public and private debts
would raise annual debt service some $3.0 billion to more than
$10.9 billion."' This was not an insubstantial amount in an econ-
omy with a gross national product of $55.8 billion.100 But it was in
no sense a monetary drain since every dollar paid was received by
someone else. And then, as at other times, the principal of long-
term debt was often refinanced.
The burden of debt service was largely attributable not to the
gold clauses but to a sharp decline in the gross national product
from $103.4 billion in 1929 to the 1933 figure of $55.8 billion. A
large portion of this decline represented a fall in prices. Wholesale
prices had fallen by one-third between 1929 and 1932.101 Fixed
price obligations became much more burdensome, just as they be-
came less burdensome during the inflation of the 1970's, when the
consumer price index approximately doubled.10 2 Nevertheless,
none of the parties made any attempt to justify invalidation of
gold clauses (when construed as gold value clauses) on strictly eco-
nomic grounds by evaluating the effects of enforcement using such
economic criteria as production of goods and services or
unemployment.
In the face of this paucity of economic evidence or even lay-
man's economic reasoning, it is worth examining the possibility
that something quite different motivated President Roosevelt, the
Congress, and the Court. The most reasonable hypothesis is that
the purpose of prohibiting the enforcement of clauses even on a
gold value basis was to redistribute income from creditors to debt-
" See Brief for the United States and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at 35
n.14, United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), reprinted in Kurland & Cas-
per, supra note 21, at 259 n.14. The government's brief later used somewhat different and
partially inconsistent numbers. See id. at 48-53, reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note
21, at 272-77. See also estimates based on a detailed list of U.S. obligations outstanding on
May 31, 1933, in Brief for the United States at 13 n.12, Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330
(1935), reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 685 n.12.
100 See ECONoMIc REPORT (1981), supra note 3, at 233 (Table B-i).
101 See id. (table of gross national product from 1929 to 1980). See also Brief for the
United States and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at 33, United States v. Bankers
Trust, 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (table and chart for U.S. wholesale commodity prices), reprinted
in Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 257.
102 Changes in methods of tabulation make it difficult to compare the wholesale price
indexes for 1929-32 with those published for the 1970's. The consumer price index rose from
116.3 in 1970 to 229.9 in December 1979. See ECONOMIc REPORT (1981), supra note 3, at 289
(Table B-50).
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ors. Certainly the President in a moment of economic candor took
the position that the purpose of the Joint Resolution was "to pre-
vent unfair profits from accruing to a very small group of creditors
and the placing of unfair burdens. . . on the corresponding debt-
ors" through enforcement of gold clause promises.103 Such profits
he considered "unearned." He had wanted "[t]o restrict the 'unjus-
tified enrichment'-the unearned profit from gold and foreign ex-
change-which at other times here and at all times in most other
Nations was permitted to fall to a privileged few as a result of gov-
ernmental monetary action. ' 104 The Court did not quite adopt the
redistributive notion that it would be unfair to allow creditors to
benefit from the enforcement of debtors' promises, but it did en-
dorse the idea that enforcement would be unfair to the debtor in
the context of a devaluation of the dollar in terms of gold. It is
unfairness to the debtor, rather than any macroeconomic concept,
that appears to lie behind the otherwise puerile observation previ-
ously noted that gold clause debtors would have to pay "one dollar
and sixty-nine cents in currency while respectively receiving their
taxes, rates, charges and prices on the basis of one dollar of that
currency."105
The willingness of the Court to endorse the redistributive de-
sire to help debtors at the expense of creditors may seem rather
odd when one considers that the actual obligors in the Gold Clause
Cases were large railroads, banks, and the United States itself and
that many of the bondholders were doubtless individuals, perhaps
even "widows and orphans." But the government had gone out of
its way to emphasize that gold clauses were common in farm and
home mortgages.10 The Court had already revealed a willingness
to uphold legislative interference with such mortgage obligations in
the case of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell.10 7
16$ Roosevelt's explanatory note accompanying Proclamation No. 2072 (Jan. 31, 1934),
reprinted in 3 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 73.
10 Id., reprinted in 3 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 70.
106 Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. at 315-16. See supra text accompanying
note 98.
'I" See Brief for the United States and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at 49,
United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), reprinted in Kurland & Casper,
supra note 21, at 273, which analogizes enforcement of gold clauses to "a tax per year of
more than $20 on every man, woman, and child in this country." See also id. at 50-51,
reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 274-75; Stenographic Report of the Oral
Argument of Honorable Homer Cummings, Attorney General of the United States, on be-
half of the Government, at 33, Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), re-
printed in Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 817.
10 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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The Gold Clause Cases cannot, however, be written off as an
exercise in populism. It seems apparent from the tone of the opin-
ions that the majority felt that enforcement of the gold clauses
would not merely be unfair to debtors but would provide a windfall
to creditors. Certainly the government so argued.108 How, one may
ask, can it be a windfall to enforce a bargained-for promise in the
very situation envisaged by the explicit words of the promise-a
change in the value of the currency in terms of gold?10 ' There are
two possible answers to that question, one essentially illegitimate
and the other somewhat more weighty.
The illegitimate answer would be to deny that anyone actually
bargained for the gold clauses. Some of the arguments before the
Court implied that the gold clauses were mere boilerplate that had
been included in loan agreements and mortgages by lawyers from
time out of mind without attention from the borrower and
lender.11 0 This boilerplate argument seems wrongheaded on two
grounds. First, even if it were true that most or even all parties did
not focus on the gold clause in their negotiations, it is hard to see
why that should make any difference. Courts do not normally re-
fuse to enforce form contracts merely because they are form con-
tracts. Second, the gold clauses were originally inserted in con-
tracts in the United States (unlike Great Britain, where gold
clauses were relatively rare1 ") for concrete reasons. These clauses
increased in importance with the Civil War greenback experience
when Congress, by giving paper money legal tender quality, bene-
fited debtors at the expense of creditors with respect to pre-ex-
I"8 "When claimant demands $16,931.25 for his $10,000 Liberty bond, he is not asking
the Goverment to pay him what the Government actually received for the bond. He is not
asking for payment of an equivalent amount; he is asking for a windfall." Brief for the
United States at 60-61, Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), reprinted in Kurland &
Casper, supra note 21, at 732-33.
'x "Promises in contracts are not subject to defeat simply because they turn out to be
to the advantage of the promisee. A contract is a bargain for enrichment, or for some other
anticipated advantage, a bargain presumably made for satisfactory consideration." Hart,
supra note 87, at 1080.
110 See, e.g., Brief for the United States and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at
114-18, United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), reprinted in Kurland &
Casper, supra note 21, at 342.
"I Brief for the United States and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at 68 n.29,
United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), reprinted in Kurland & Casper,
supra note 21, at 292 n.29. For surveys of international practice relating to gold clauses, see
G. DELAUME, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT FI-
NANCING 258-61, 267 n.22, 276-85 (1967); Nussbaum, Comparative and International As-
pects of American Gold Clause Abrogation, 44 YALE L.J. 53, 60-65 (1934).
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isting contracts." 2 Those creditors who had gold coin clauses were
protected against inflation during the greenback period, and it
would have been difficult for other creditors not to have learned
their lesson, especially as the government itself issued gold clause
obligations throughout the greenback period." 3 The use of gold
clauses received another boost from the free silver agitation of the
late nineteenth century.11 4 In short, if gold clauses had become a
matter of form, it was for good economic reasons.
But the fact was that gold clauses were not placed in loan
agreements and mortgages indiscriminately. Only about fifty-five
percent of long-term obligations were subject to gold clauses. " 5
Something other than absence of mind must have led some parties
to include gold clauses and others to leave them out. The govern-
ment itself in its Perry brief recognized the need to compare obli-
gations that included a gold clause with those that did not." 6
In any case, the inclusion of a gold clause may be expected, on
general principles, to have resulted in a lower interest rate since it
protected the creditor, albeit quite imperfectly, against inflation.117
The gold clause was, in short, a primitive form of indexation. ""'
The government talked out of both sides of its mouth on this issue.
In Bankers Trust it argued that, at least once Roosevelt obtained
legislative authorization to devalue the dollar, it would have been
impossible for the government to borrow without either including a
gold clause or paying "prohibitive rates" of interest. " Yet the gov-
',2 See generally Dam, supra note 16. On the greenback period as the origin of wide-
spread use of gold clauses, see M. FRmDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 71 n.78. See
also Hanna, Currency Control and Private Property, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 617, 633 n.20
(1933).
,Is See Dam, supra note 16, at 374, 410 n.199.
" See M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 107 n.27; A. NUSSBAUM, supra
note 19, at 188; Hanna, supra note 112, at 633 n.20.
11 Brief for the United States and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at 35 n.14,
United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), reprinted in Kurland & Casper,
supra note 21, at 259 n.14.
"I See Brief for the United States at 70-75, Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935),
reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 742-46.
'17 See 77 CoNG. Rnc. 4534 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Luce); Garis, supra note 2, at 220.
"I' See generally GOLD, MONEY AND THE LAW (H. Manne & R. Miller eds. 1975) (discus-
sion of gold clauses and indexation).
" The government argument was, to be sure, based on the premise that since old is-
sues contained a gold clause, new public issues without one would be at a competitive disad-
vantage unless offered at "prohibitive rates." See Brief for the United States and the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation at 60-61, United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240
(1935), reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 284-85. But that is exactly the
point. When both gold clause and non-gold clause obligations were issued, a debtor would
have to pay more if he wanted to avoid indexation of principal and interest implied by a
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ermnent argued in Perry that gold clauses were ineffectual: bonds
sold at the same price, whether or not they contained a gold
clause.120 This latter argument seems particularly fallacious, al-
though selective nondisclosure of the underlying data prevents any
close analysis of the government's argument. In the absence of in-
formation about the face interest rate, the fact that two issues sell
at the same price tells us nothing about the effective interest rates.
For example, the government attempted to show that two series of
treasury bonds with essentially the same maturities, one with a
gold clause and one without, sold roughly at par and at almost ex-
actly the same price. Yet the gold clause bonds bore an interest
rate of 3% % and the non-gold clause bond prices appear to have
been derived by averaging prices for bonds ranging in face interest
rate from 3 to 4 %.11 The midpoint of that range was 3 / %,
well above the 33/8 % face yield for the gold clause bond. The natu-
ral conclusion would therefore have been that a higher interest rate
was required when a gold clause was not used.
A somewhat more weighty argument for viewing the creditor
as receiving a windfall if gold clauses had been enforced after the
devaluation of the dollar in January 1934 has to do with the un-
usual nature of that devaluation. The argument would start from
the proposition, noted in the origin of widespread use of gold
clauses,122 that the prime economic function of gold clauses was to
protect the creditor against inflation. Devaluation is usually associ-
ated with inflation or, more precisely, with a more rapid rate of
inflation than that of other countries. Inflation was not, however,
the cause of the 1934 devaluation. Quite the contrary, for, as noted
above, prices had fallen rapidly since 1929. Although periods of
price declines had been common in American history, the 1929-33
decline had been uncommonly abrupt.123 The purpose of the deval-
gold clause. Hence it is fatuous to argue that the gold clause was not bargained for.
120 See the government's argument with respect to two obligations of the Chicago, Bur-
lington and Quincy Railroad, Brief for the United States at 73-74, Perry v. United States,
294 U.S. 330 (1935), reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 745-46. Because both
the face interest rates and the maturities of the two bonds were substantially different (one
maturing 13 years after the other), one cannot evaluate this evidence without knowing the
shape of the yield curve throughout this period.
2I See Brief for the United States at 28-29, Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935),
reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 700-01.
222 See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
122 For a plotting of the wholesale price index from 1867 to 1960, see M. FRiEDmAN & A.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 678 (Chart 62). As is obvious from that chart, the 1929-33 de-
cline was not as sharp as the 1920-21 decline but it lasted longer. In the nineteenth century,
declines were gentler but tended to last much longer.
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uation was not to bring the dollar exchange rate into correspon-
dence with the relative purchasing power of the U.S. and foreign
currencies. Instead, Roosevelt sought to generate inflation by forc-
ing the exchange rate out of such correspondence. 124 This was in
part what later critics had in mind when they sought through the
Bretton Woods agreement to prevent such "competitive deprecia-
tion" of the currency.12 5
Thus, by 1933 holders of obligations that had been outstand-
ing since 1928 or before had already experienced a considerable
increase in the purchasing power of interest payments and in the
implicit purchasing power of outstanding principal. To enforce the
gold clause and thereby award a further increase in nominal dol-
lars in interest and principal must have seemed to be rewarding
the creditor twice over. A numerical example may help to explain
this point. Assume that a $1000 bond was issued bearing a five
percent interest rate (fifty dollars per annum) in 1929. Using the
wholesale price index as a measure, that fifty dollars per annum
would buy one-third more by 1933; thus it was worth over sixty-
five dollars in 1929 dollars. After the 1934 devaluation, enforce-
ment of the gold clause would have increased the purchasing power
of interest payments to $110 in 1929 dollars, an effective yield in
real terms of eleven percent on the 1929 investment. 26 To be sure,
the Roosevelt program was inflationary; by the time the Gold
Clause Cases were decided in February 1935 wholesale prices had
risen thirty-three percent above the 1933 nadir. The case for pro-
tecting creditors therefore should have seemed stronger than at the
time of the Joint Resolution. But as wholesale prices were still
nearly seventeen percent below the 1929 level,1 27 the windfall argu-
ment was not entirely baseless.
V
The Treasury continued to buy gold at the new thirty-five-dol-
124 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
125 See K. DAM, supra note 11, at 63-64, 88-92.
"' In 1929 the wholesale price index stood at 95.3; in 1933 it was 65.9. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNrraD STATES, COLONIAL
IEs To 1957, at 116 (1960) (Table E 13-24, Wholesale Price Indexes). The effective return
would actually be higher than 11%, taking into account payment of the principal amount on
maturity at $1690. The exact effective return would depend on the bond's maturity date.
M In February 1935 the wholesale price index stood at 79.5, compared with the 1929
annual figure of 95.3. Federal Reserve Statistics, 21 FAD. RESERVE BULL. 248 (1935). Its
lowest point was 59.8 in February 1933. Federal Reserve Statistics, 19 FED. RESERVE BULL.
783 (1933).
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lar per ounce rate. Since this price made gold production here and
abroad highly profitable and since the dollar was greatly underval-
ued as the result of the massive devaluation, gold began flowing
into the Treasury coffers. The flow accelerated as fear of Nazi Ger-
many spread in Europe. By 1939 U.S. gold holdings had increased
to $17.6 billion from $7.4 billion in February 1934.128
The U.S. gold purchases cannot be said to have placed the
country on a gold standard because those gold inflows did not nec-
essarily determine the money supply. In fact, the Treasury at one
point adopted a "sterilization" policy to prevent any expansion of
the money supply as a result of these gold inflows. 129 Still the U.S.
policy of buying and selling gold at the official price of thirty-five
dollars per ounce at the behest of foreign monetary authorities13 0
became the cornerstone of the Bretton Woods system. Under that
system, gold was held by central banks and treasuries as interna-
tional reserves, and the willingness of the United States, alone
among major countries, to buy and sell gold at an official price was
a key mechanism (together with intervention by foreign monetary
authorities) holding together the set of fixed exchange rates that
characterized the international monetary system from World War
II until the early 1970's.31L
Looking backward from the 1980's it is sometimes thought
that because of the commitment to buy and sell gold the United
States was on a gold standard during the Bretton Woods period.
But it was at best on what Milton Friedman has called a pseudo-
gold standard and not on a real one.132 There was no direct relation
between U.S. gold holdings and the money supply. 33
1" See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, BANKING AND MONE-
TARY STATISTICS 536-38 (1943). See generally F. GRAHAM & C. WHrITLE sY, GOLDEN AVA-
LANcRE 3-28, 41-66 (1939).
1 2 See A Treasury Statement on the Sterilization of Gold (Dec. 22, 1936), reprinted in
5 FDR PAPERS, supra note 1, at 617. See also M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at
506-11; Bernstein, supra note 25, at 314-16.
SO See Provisional Regulations Issued Under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, §§ 42, 44,
20 FED. RESERVE BuLL. at 82, 88 (1934); Review of the Month, 20 FED. RESERVE BULL. 141
(1934). The price on sale involved a slight charge comparable to the "gold points" under the
gold standard.
131 See K. DAM, supra note 11, at 95-98.
132 Friedman, Real and Pseudo Gold Standards, 4 J.L. & ECON. 66, 74 (1961).
1" To be sure, there remained a gold cover requirement in U.S. domestic law. Federal
Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 16, 38 Stat. 251, 265-266 (1913) (current version codified in relevant
part at 12 U.S.C. § 413 (1976)). The Federal Reserve Act required reserves of 35% in "gold
or lawful money" against Federal Reserve deposits and of 40% in gold against Federal Re-
serve notes. This requirement was reduced to a uniform 25% in gold certificates in 1945,
when the System was approaching the minimums set in 1913. Federal Reserve Act Amend-
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By 1960 the U.S. Treasury was more likely to be on the selling
than the buying side of gold transactions. The dollar was at mid-
point in a long passage from undervalued status during the "dollar
shortage" period just after World War II to the overvalued status
that led to the suspension of the gold undertaking in 1971. The
Kennedy Administration came to power with the mission of pre-
serving the U.S. gold commitment. The mission required, in its
view, policies that would arrest the decline in U.S. gold holdings.3
The most immediate threat was perceived to be the tendency of
gold to rise above thirty-five dollars per ounce in private markets
abroad. (There was, of course, no domestic market except for the
tightly controlled market for newly mined gold and for industrial
users.) Although the United States sold gold only to foreign mone-
tary authorities, it feared arbitrage by central banks between the
private and the official market, resulting in a gold outflow from the
United States.3 5
The Kennedy Administration therefore prohibited U.S. citi-
zens from holding gold not just within the United States, as had
been the case since 1934,18 but anywhere in the world.1 '7 The no-
tion was that U.S. citizens were likely to be on the buying side of
foreign gold transactions and thereby to drive private gold prices
higher.138 Extraordinary efforts were made by the U.S. government
to avoid foreign purchases in order to relieve balance of payments
ments, Pub. L. No. 79-84, § 1, 59 Stat. 237, 237 (1945) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 248, 413-414
(1976)). In 1965 the requirement was abolished entirely for deposits. See Act of Mar. 3,
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-3, § 1, 79 Stat. 5 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 413 (1976)), and in
1968 it was abolished for notes, see Act of Mar. 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-269, 82 Stat. 50
(current version at 12 U.S.C. § 391 (1976)).
134 Kennedy "used to tell his advisers that the two things which scared him most were
nuclear war and the payments deficit." A. ScHLEsNmOR, A THOUSAND DAYS 654 (1965). On
anxiety over possible foreign gold claims and a foreign exchange crisis, see id. at 651-55 and
T. SORENSEN, KENNEDY 406-09 (1965). U.S. gold holdings had fallen from $22.8 billion in
1950 to $17.8 billion in 1960 and continued to slide to $14.1 billion in 1965 and $11.1 billion
in 1970. IMF, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTIcs 2-3 (1972 Supp.).
135 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 137, 185-86.
13' See Provisional Regulations Issued under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, § 14, 20
FED. RESERVE BuLL. 82, 84 (1934) (permitting citizens to hold gold outside the United
States); see also supra text accompanying note 64.
'37 Exec. Order No. 11,037, 3 C.F.R., 1959-1963 Comp., at 621 (1964). The courts con-
tinued to uphold the power to prohibit private ownership of gold against challenges based
on the absence of any national emergency justifying such a prohibition. See, e.g., Pike v.
United States, 340 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1965). See also Holzer, How Americans Lost Their
Right To Own Gold-And Became Criminals In The Process, 39 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 517,
546-52 (1973).
13 The United States also fed gold into foreign markets to depress the private gold
market price. See K. DAM, supra note 11, at 137-38, 185-86 (discussion of the 1961 Gold
Pool).
1983]
The University of Chicago Law Review
pressures on the dollar, with Secretary of Defense Robert McNa-
mara going so far as to adopt a "gold budget" limiting offshore
military procurement.139 The United States also adopted extensive
exchange controls in order to control dollar outflows. 140
These extensive efforts were to no lasting avail. On August 15,
1971, President Nixon announced that the United States would no
longer honor its pledge to buy and sell gold, not just at thirty-five
dollars per ounce but at any price whatever.141 The U.S. gold win-
dow had been closed. 14 Although the United States later devalued
the dollar not simply in terms of other currencies but also in terms
of gold, the new official price of thirty-eight dollars (increased in
1973 to $42.22) had little significance. It was, in the phrase of the
time, the price at which the United States did not buy or sell
gold.1 43 Thus, even when the private market gold price reached
$875 in January 1980,144 U.S. gold holdings continued to be valued
at $42.22 per ounce without any resulting impact on gold flows or
on the U.S. exchange rate.
This very disconnection between the private gold market and
the international position of the U.S. dollar had major implications
for the dollar. Once the gold window was closed, the need to pro-
tect the U.S. gold stock declined. In 1973 the President was given
statutory power to abolish the prohibition against private gold
holdings.14 5 , This sharp reversal was uncontroversial, being sup-
ported both by the proponents of floating exchange rates who
sought to have gold treated like any other commodity and by those
who wanted to return to the gold standard. Since the United
States was the only major country to prohibit its citizens from
holding gold, even those who wanted to see a return to a Bretton
Woods system reluctantly acceded to the logic of repeal. 14 In Au-
gust 1974, in the absence of any presidential action under the 1973
13, G. TREVERTON, THE DOLLAR DRAIN AND AmERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY 8-10, 34-40
(1978); see also Annual Message to the Congress: The Economic Report of the President,
1968-69 PUB. PAuns 126, 135 (Feb. 1, 1968) (discussing steps taken to improve U.S. balance
of payments); President's News Conference, 1968-69 PuB. PAPERS 1 (Jan. 1, 1968).
140 See G. SHULTZ & K. DAm, EcONOMIC POLIcY BEYOND THE HEADLINES 111 (1978).
M Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy- "The Challenge of Peace,"
1971 PuB. PAPERS 886, 888 (Aug. 15, 1971).
142 See W. SAFmE, BEFORE THm FALL 509-28 (1975) (discussing the background of the
decision to close the "gold window").
143 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 190. See also id. at 193.
144 N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1980, at D7, col. 1.
14 Par Value Modification Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-110, § 3(b), (c), 87 Stat.
352, 352 (1973) (codified in part at 31 U.S.C. § 442 (1976) and printed in part at 31 U.S.C. §
443 note (1976)).
146 See, e.g., 119 CONG. REc. 2992-93 (1973) (statement of Sen. Bible).
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statute, the prohibition was lifted by congressional action effective
December 31, 1974.147
When the world and the dollar seemed quite unaffected by the
resumption of gold trading in the United States and when inflation
became an increasingly serious matter, pressure to repeal the 1933
Joint Resolution increased. In 1977 that further step was taken,148
but the repeal was made applicable only to "obligations issued on
or after the date of enactment of this section. '149 The courts there-
fore rejected attempts by holders of old gold clause obligations to
obtain gold or gold value at a time when gold was selling for hun-
dreds of dollars an ounce.150
VI
In October 1980 proponents of a return to the gold standard
succeeded in attaching a rider creating a Gold Commission to a
statute increasing the U.S. quota in the International Monetary
Fund. The Commission was to "conduct a study to assess and
make recommendations with regard to the policy of the United
States Government concerning the role of gold in domestic and in-
ternational monetary systems." 5 ' The Commission's report deci-
sively rejected a return to the gold standard. Only three of its sev-
enteen members favored the gold standard.152 The majority report,
M' Act of Aug. 14, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-373, § 2, 88 Stat. 445, 445 (codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 442 (1976)). The statute gave the President power to arrest automatic implementation by
filing a report but no such report was forthcoming.
"18 Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-147, § 4(c), 91 Stat. 1227, 1229 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 463 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). A 1935 Joint Resolution, ch. 780, § 2,
49 Stat. 938, 939 (1935) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 773b (1976)) withdrawing U.S. consent to be
sued on gold clauses remains in effect.
141 Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-147, § 4(c), 91 Stat. 1227, 1229 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 463 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
150 Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Grosvenor, 582 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1978), af'g 426
F. Supp. 67 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Southern Capital Corp.
v. Southern Pac. Co., 568 F.2d 590 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978); Feldman v.
Great N. Ry., 428 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Gold Bondholders Protective Council v.
Atchison, T. & S. Ry., 649 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1982).
'51 Act of Oct. 7, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-389, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 1551, 1555 (printed at 31
U.S.C. § 822a note (Supp. V 1981)).
152 Two members, Lewis Lehrman and Ronald Paul, filed a 300-page minority report to
that effect and a third, Arthur Costamagna, gave the minority report a qualified endorse-
ment. See 2 GOLD COMMISSION RzPORT, supra note 5, at 7-8. The Commission was composed
of three members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, two members of
the Council of Economic Advisers, and four private citizens drawn from business, finance, or
academia, all designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, and six members of Congress
drawn from the relevant banking and economic committees and appointed by the Speaker
of the House and President of the Senate. See Pub. L. No. 96-389, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 1551,
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having focused on the problem of inflation, came to the conclusion
that, "under present circumstances, restoring a gold standard does
not appear to be a fruitful method for dealing with the continuing
problem of inflation." 153 With regard to gold in the international
monetary system, the Commission favored not only "no change in
the flexible exchange rate system" but also "no change in the usage
of gold in the operation of the present exchange rate
arrangements. '154
The Commission did, however, recommend several actions
that could constitute minor steps toward restoration of a gold stan-
dard. The primary recommendation of this kind was for "Treasury
issue of gold bullion coins of specified weights, and without dollar
denomination or legal tender status, to be manufactured from its
existing stock of gold and to be sold at a small mark-up over the
market value of the gold content."'55 Such gold coins could, in the
view of some of their advocates, take on monetary characteristics
and thus be forerunners of gold coins in a return to a pre-1933
type of gold standard. 5 e They are more likely, however, to be
nothing more than vehicles for private investment in gold, like
Krugerrands issued by the Republic of South Africa and indeed
like gold medallions issued by the U.S. Treasury since 1980.157 It
was precisely to prevent newly issued gold "coins" from being pur-
chased for monetary purposes that opponents of a gold standard
1555 (1980) (printed at 31 U.S.C. § 822a note (Supp. V 1981)).
153 1 GOLD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 17. Some of the members criticized the
Gold Commission, one characterizing it as a "runaway" commission because it went well
beyond Congress's narrow charge to examine "'the role of gold in domestic and interna-
tional monetary systems,"' id. at 1, to analyze inflation and to issue prescriptions, including
the monetarist recommendation that "the Congress and the Federal Reserve [should] study
the merits of establishing a rule specifying that the growth of the nation's money supply be
maintained at a steady rate which insures long-run price stability," id. at 17. The Commis-
sion's principal staff member was Anna J. Schwartz, coauthor of the massive MONETARY
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 8, with Milton Friedman, the best-known advo-
cate of such a monetary rule.
I" 1 GOLD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 20.
153 Id. at 9. The report also recommended that sales of the coins be exempt from capital
gains and sales taxes. The Commission opposed "issue of Treasury gold-backed notes or
bonds." Id. at 10. Such an obligation would be equivalent to a bond containing a gold clause.
The case for such an issue would be twofold: the interest cost would presumably be lower
than for conventional borrowings because the principal would be indexed to gold, and the
issue would be a step toward a greater role for gold. It is interesting that France issued gold
securities ("Giscard bonds") in 1973, which because of the rise in the price of gold are now
quoted at a considerable multiple of the original issue price. See, e.g., Dare France discard
the Giscard?, EcONOMIST, July 5, 1980, at 86.
'"See 1 GOLD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
'T These medallions are issued under the American Arts Gold Medallion Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-630, tit. IV, §§ 402-407, 92 Stat. 3641, 3679-80 (1978).
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successfully resisted the imprinting of any dollar denomination
and the according of legal tender status to such coins.158
VII
A return to the gold standard is not imminent. But many of
the decisions made by the President and the Congress in 1933 in
order to take the United States off the gold standard are no longer
in force. Citizens may own gold, even gold in a medallion form that
looks much like coin, and post-1977 gold clauses are now fully en-
forceable. The Gold Clause Cases now apply only to pre-1977
contracts.
The Gold Commission report was in many ways a non-event.
The steps it recommended would make little difference. What is
important about the report is that, a half century after the depar-
ture from the gold standard and at a time when nostalgia for a
return to that standard was at a high point, only three out of sev-
enteen votes could be mustered in support of that goal. The fact
that, despite the steps backward toward the pre-1933 legal situa-
tion, a gold standard is still economically as far away as it was in
the Roosevelt years shows that a gold standard requires much
more far-reaching changes than those seriously considered thus far.
The polity is unwilling to subject the domestic money supply and
interest rates to any external and arbitrary rule based on gold
holdings and flows.
Nor is there much support for a return to fixed exchange rates
based on gold. The volatility in gold's price has diminished its ap-
peal as an anchor for the world's economies and has made it ap-
pear practically impossible for the Treasury to commit itself to a
fixed price at which the dollar would be convertible into gold.159
Nonetheless, the grave problems that have arisen under the post-
1973 floating exchange rate system have made a fixed exchange
rate system appear attractive to many U.S. financial leaders.
If rates of inflation continue to decline around the world, a
return to fixed exchange rates may be possible. Gold would be
likely to find a role in a fixed exchange rate system, especially as
such a large proportion of national holdings of international
reserves are in gold. 1 °0 Under such circumstances, a return to a
158 See 1 GOLD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 7-9.
For a discussion of this issue, see K. DAM, supra note 11, at 338-41.
1 The amended Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund have
largely phased gold out of the formal international monetary system. See K. DAM, supra
note 11, at 269-75. But gold plays a major role in the sense that 49% of international
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full-scale gold standard might come to be seen as a viable policy
option by a much wider range of monetary experts and elected offi-
cials. On the other hand, the necessary precondition for considera-
tion of a return to the gold standard, a long-term subsidence in
inflation both here and abroad, would itself undermine much of
the political case for such a return. The case for a gold standard is
most appealing when inflation is rampant but, paradoxically, rapid
inflation makes a gold standard impracticable.
reserves were still held in the form of gold at the end of 1981. Despite the decline in gold
prices, global gold reserves were valued at $379.9 billion, as against a total for non-gold
reserves of $396.3 billion. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, FIFTY-SECOND ANNUAL RE-
PORT 162 (1982).
